gives all details for "Other" sources. http://keratoplastika.dp.ua/en/the-legislative-framework.html Ernst & Young (2017) , (N =47), Ernst & Young (2017) Figure 2 in the main manuscript, and This section provides results for other variables that could potentially explain presumed consent policies.
Since organ transplants are more likely in economically developed countries, we check if development plays a role in determining donation policies. To that avail, we use life expectancy and literacy rate as proxies for economic development. We also include net government debt to broadly check if countries with preferences for tighter budgets or less expansionary policies are more likely to pass either type of law. Similarly, we check whether political preferences are correlated with any particular policy. First, we check for preferences for a public health system. In this case, we use the size of the public health care system (relative to the total health spending and to GDP), as well as public spending in health care per capita. Furthermore, we also check if preferences for wealth redistribution are correlated with organ donations laws. Highest income tax rate and highest inheritance tax rate broadly capture such preferences -hence, we use them as proxies. Finally, we also add controls that measure the degree of gender equality (% of parliamentary MPs who are women), of economic equality (Gini Index), and level of corruption. We also include another control for religion (% of the population who follow the main religion in the country). The updated regression specification is
where z is the new variable control added. As before, Policy i is a dummy that captures presumed consent (1=presumed consent; 0=explicit consent), i denotes country, and X is a vector of explanatory variables comprised of legal origins, GDP per capita, State religion, main religion, percent of the population who are religious, democracy index, and OECD membership.
Given the small size of our data set, we include the controls one at a time. Results show that variables that proxy economic development are, in general, positively correlated with presumed consent policies (bars with empty diamonds). However, they lose their explanatory power when the full set of controls is taken into consideration (bars with solid squares). This is the case also for size of public health care system: those countries where a larger proportion of resources are devoted to public health care seem to be more likely to pass presumed consent laws. Also, more unequal countries (higher Gini index) are less likely to legislate presumed consent. All these results are however not robust to including a full set of controls. 
Including countries with unclear policies
Finally, we include all countries in our dataset. Our results in the main manuscript include countries for which there is enough information for us to determine whether the country has opt-in (coded as 0) or opt-out (coded as 1) policies. Results in Table 5 below also include countries that do not have clear policies, or that have a mixed system (N increases from 87 to 93). In order to be consistent with our focus throughout the paper (what explains presumed consent), we code all unclear/mixed countries with '0', too. Hence, our new dependent variable represents legislating presumed consent vs. everything else (explicit consent or unclear/mixed).
Results are consistent with those presented in the main manuscript. The only difference is that in this case, percentage of religious population is no longer significant at a 5% level. This suggests that more research should be devoted to fully disentangling the relationship between religious population and organ donation laws. 
